In the first chapter “Are We There Yet” from A World atTotal War, Roger Chickering and Stig Forster analyze the meaning and
development of the concept of “Total War.”
Because of a failure to make certain, vital distinctions in their
analysis, the writers do not succeed in their main purpose in defining what
“total war” is. The worst part of this essay is the author's egregious moral equivalence between Nazi Germany and the Western Allies. Considering Auschwitz and Hiroshima to be on a moral par is a confession of one's own moral imbecility.
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| Not an Agent of Genocide |
The authors note that the “hallmark” of total war is the use
of military violence against civilians (pp. 11). One reason for this, the authors recognize,
is the full mobilization of a nation’s economy in the pursuit military
victory. This led to the blurring, or
ending, of the distinction between combatant and non-combatant during World War
II. The reason for this is generally
viewed to be the other defining factor of total war: total economic
mobilization. As the authors state total
war requires “the thoroughgoing mobilization of industrial economies in the war
effort, and hence the disciplined organization of civilians no less than
warriors” (pp. 2) The authors relate how
this led theorist such as Guilio Douhet to conclude that civilians (or at least
factory workers) were legitimate targets of opposing military forces. In the context of World War I trench warfare
anything that could break the deadlock and bring the war to a conclusion was considered
justified. Although, it wasn’t until
World War II that technology, particularly the long range bomber, made this
strategy possible.
The “unpacking” this essay deserves would require a
considerably longer paper than space allows; therefore I
will only mention a few of the methodological problems and factual omissions of
serious consequence. There are four
distinct concepts the authors include in their definition of “total war” that I
believe should remain distinct. These
are, 1: The degree of a nation’s economic mobilization, 2: Civilians as
primary or secondary targets or as collateral damage, 3: The treatment of POWs or war of No Quarter, 4:
Genocide.
As the authors note the original definition of total war
referred to economic mobilization. The
French coined the terms “guerre totale” and “guerre integrale” for their
nation’s total mobilization in the last two years of World War I. There is obviously no clear line that can be
drawn between limited and total war regarding mobilization. The authors engage in some tedious
hairsplitting on whether the United
States fully mobilized during World War II
and therefore engaged in total war.
The authors cite Maurice Matloff “The Ninety Division
Gamble” from Kent Roberts Greenfield volume of the Green Series Command
Decisions. The authors, however, do
not provide quotes or statistics to support their position that it’s hyperbole
to claim the US
totally mobilized for World War II (pp. 7).
I don’t have a copy of Command Decisions handy, however in Strategic
Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944 Maurice Matloff explicitly states
that the “ninety division gamble” was the direct result of manpower shortages: “By
1943 the ‘arsenal of democracy,’ as the United States had come to be called,
was just beginning to hit its full productive stride…Although increased use of
women and Negroes, establishment of longer working hours, and improved
efficiency in war plants eventually served to augment production, the manpower
situation by early 1943 appeared grave” (Maurice Matloff (1959) Strategic
Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944. Washington D.C.:
Office of the Chief of Military History. pp. 113, 116). The concern was that drafting skilled workers
would affect production, which could not be allowed. And not just for factory workers, in November
1942 Congress gave a blanket draft deferment to all agricultural workers (pp.
116).
Regarding Nazi Germany and total
war it should not be forgotten that Blitzkrieg was as much an economic concept
as a military one. Hitler’s purpose was
to avoid full mobilization with quick decisive wars and to not get engage in a
total war of exhaustion that the German economy could not hope to win. In fact, Nazi Germany did not begin full economic mobilization until after Stalingrad when it was too late.
Chickering’s and Forster’s evaluation of how civilians
became targets in total war beginning in World War I and culminating in the
Second World War has problems of special pleading. In their analysis they apparently think it’s
irrelevant who were the aggressors in these wars and who initiated this aspect
of total war. They note that nearly 740
German civilians were killed in allied bombing raids during World War I;
however they fail to note how many British civilians were killed during the
preceding Zeppelin raids (pp. 12). While
discussing the bombing raids of World War II the names Guernica, Warsaw, Rotterdam
and London are
not mentioned. This is no small matter
in evaluating later allied bombing campaigns.
On July 8, 1940
Winston Churchill wrote a memo to the Minister of Aircraft Production, Lord
Beaverbrook, “I look round to see how we can win the war, I see that there is
only own sure path,” and that was “an absolutely devastating, exterminating
attack by very heavy bombers from this country…” (Their
Finest Hour. New York:
Bantam Books, 1977, pp. 548). That both the
British people and leaders where willing to go to extremes was motivated and justified by previous German
attacks. As an interesting side issue it
should be noted that making a large, powerful democracy desperate and fearful
for its continued existence can result in very bad things for the fascist
aggressors. The process of “taking off
the gloves” in warfare doesn’t happen overnight and the beginning of it should
not be ignored.
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| Dresden 1945. Not Auschwitz, Not Even Close |
Wars of No Quarter have been fought throughout history. One example is the Texas Revolution of
1835-6. General Santa Ana apparently thought of the Texans as
rebels and therefore not worthy of the rules of warfare. At the Alamo
he put the defenders to the sword. At
Goliad he had 400 captured Texan soldiers executed. At San Jacinto
the Texans responded by killing hundreds of Mexican soldiers as they tried to
surrender yelling “me no Alamo;” they
understood. The Texas Revolution was a
“small war” regarding the number involved, however it was a brutal one by early
nineteenth century standards. While both
the United States
and England
participated in Second World War’s total nature, both country’s treated Axis
prisoners according to the Geneva Convention.
Lastly, the most troubling aspect of this essay, its “revisionist”
view of the Holocaust. The authors
state, “Genocide was the other face of total war…The history of total war was
driven by material and ideological forces that culminated respectively in
Hiroshima and Auschwitz – in weapons that did not discriminate and policies
that did so with a vengeance” (pp. 12-13).
This is an example of the old tactic to “normalize” the Holocaust and
the continuing of the “Historikerstreit” or Historians Conflict that began in Germany in the
1980s. As stated above, Hitler’s purpose
was to avoid total war, not begin one.
Hitler’s purpose was not total war but social engineering. Social engineering doesn’t necessarily
require total or limited war. As the
cases of Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot demonstrate.
In fact both Hitler’s and Stalin’s example demonstrate that mass murder
as social engineering seriously degrades any war effort through vast wasted
resources including, in Stalin’s case, a better part of his officer corps. As Benjamin B. Weber, in his essay “Shades of
Revisionism: Holocaust Denial and the Conservative Call to Reinterpret German
History,” details some of the tactics used to “normalize” the Holocaust,
including “the intentional denigration of the Holocaust and the Third Reich”
(Benjamin B. Weber. (December 1996) “Shades of Revisionism” University of Vermont:
History Review Vol 6.
Reducing the Holocaust to another aspect of total war is
just what the authors are doing by using Auschwitz and Hiroshima in the same
sentence. Whether one agrees with the
dropping of the A-bombs on Japan,
and the earlier firebombings, these actions had an identifiable war related
purpose, to force the Japanese to surrender.
Auschwitz had no purpose to which even
a partially sane person can fathom. It
is not an aspect of total war but as the Nuremburg Tribunal the Holocaust was a
Crime Against Humanity.
Gunter Bischof is the head of Center Austria at Tulane University. He has also tried to make a connection
between the Pacific Theater and the crimes of the SS. On May 31, 2004 he posted an article at the History NewsNetwork, “The American ‘Good War’ vs. the German ‘Bad War’: World War II Memory
Cultures.” Towards the end of the article after
discussing the Enola Gay exhibit Bischof states: “While in Germany the
veterans’ organization had failed to salvage their selective memories of the
killing fields on the Eastern front, in the United States the veterans
succeeded in enforcing their one-sided memory of heroic marines and valiant
sailors. Their killing frenzies in the
island campaign and trophy taking of Japanese body parts was purged from the
public memory.” The comparison of
American combat soldiers in the Pacific with Einsatzgruppen is now apparently
acceptable for scholarly discourse. It
should be remembered however, that if “Hap” Arnold and “Bomber” Harris are as
bad as Adolf Eichmann and Reinhardt Heydrich: then Eichmann and Heydrich are no
worse than Arnold and Harris.